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BUREAUCRATS IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES:              
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ITALIAN EXPERIENCE 
Nadia Carboni 
ABSTRACT 
This article investigates the extent to which administrative reforms have affected 
traditional political and administrative roles, by empirical accounts of the main 
changes to the Italian Senior Civil Service. The analysis is conducted in the field of the 
central government which was involved in a NPM inspired reform process during the 
Nineties and which introduced the principle of separation between management and 
politics. The separation of politics from administration has paradoxically resulted in the 
search for new forms of political control and mechanisms of integration between 
political and bureaucratic élites. The gradual introduction of reforms combined with 
attempts to obtain a more responsive bureaucracy by increasing political control seems 
to have had a positive effect on Italian government, moving the political-administrative 
relationship from a ‘self-restraint’ to a ‘complementarity’ pattern. As explained in the 
article some changes in this respect may be viewed as controversial. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The most recent comparative studies in the public administration field (Page and Wright 
1999–2007; Gualmini 2003; Peters and Pierre 2001–2004; Carboni 2008; Goldfinch and 
Wallis 2009) highlight a deep transformation of the public sector in western 
democracies during the last three decades. By comparing the main features of current 
European administrations with those of the Sixties and Seventies, it appears that the 
Weberian model has been somehow overcome (Gualmini 2003). The introduction and 
the adoption of the private sector assumptions, rationality, procedures and tools, some 
embedded in the national government level and context, represents an increasing 
departure from the legal-rational bureaucratic model. This transformation process has 
affected Italian public administration as well, pushing it in two directions (Mattei 2007; 
Carboni 2007; Gualmini 2003; Endrici 2001). 
 
First, the New Public Management (NPM) approach has introduced managerial 
rationality into Italian bureaucracy (Rebora 1999). It has redefined the role and 
responsibility of bureaucrats, who have been increasingly required to become public 
managers, and also the relationship of the latter with politicians. As a consequence of 
the reform process, the principle of separation between politicians and top executives 
has been affirmed by law since 1993. Politicians are expected to define policies, assign 
goals and responsibilities, and evaluate results; while managers have been attributed the 
autonomy to manage their own unit and to be responsible for implementing political 
plans. NPM has therefore challenged the traditional model of public administration in 
Italy by introducing private sector oriented managerial logic and tools (Hood, 1991). It 
has attempted to transform the ‘classical bureaucrat’ (Putnam 1973) into the ‘manager’. 
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In theory, by ‘letting the managers manage’ it has given bureaucrats greater autonomy 
from political bodies.   
Second, another theme of reform is that of the Senior Civil Service and its fiduciary 
relations (Mattei 2007; Carboni 2007; Merloni 2006; Endrici 2001) which have been 
changed through the expansion of ministerial discretion in appointing top level 
bureaucrats. This change was introduced in Italy in 1998 and was consolidated in 2002 
by the adoption of what is commonly refered to as the spoils system. In Italy the 
introduction of a what might be tremed a neo-spoils system (because such a system 
existed prior to reform) apparently has been conceived as a positive response to the 
greater autonomy provided to bureaucrats given the increased separation of politics 
from administration. Under the new system IT is posited that politicians now look for 
more trustworthy bureaucrats than in the past in choosing who to appoint to the top 
levels of government bureaucracies. But is this change likely to prove positive over the 
long-term? This aspect of reform in Italy is controversial when viewed in the larger 
context of modern public administration in that one of the primary purposes for 
establishing formal, rule driven and honest civil service systems worldwide has long 
been (over the past 100 years in the many nations) to eliminate spoils systems and the 
patronage, corruption and other problems it creates or exacerbates. 
 
The article explores the consequences of administrative reforms on the relationship 
between politicians and bureaucrats within the core executive using empirical analysis 
of the Italian case based on data gathered between the nineties and the beginning of the 
millennium at central government level. Two influential research projects were carried 
out respectively in 1991 and 2002 to develop an overview of the Senior Civil Service 
before and after reforms. The first research focused on the Minister’s functions, his staff 
and the Senior Civil Service (IRSTA, 1991); it included a sample of 92 respondents 
divided in 49 politicians and 43 top officials. The second project (Institute Cattaneo, 
2002) addressed the Senior Civil Service according to different institutional models of 
administrative competence and managerial skills; interviewed senior civil servants 
represented about 12–13 percent of the universe of managers employed by the central 
(758), regional (740), and local (217) governments. The questionnaires submitted to top 
bureaucrats in both research projects were structured into four main sections on social 
background, pattern of recruitment and career, political-administrative relationship and 
finally their ideas and opinions about administrative reforms. 
The article is structured as follows. The first segment develops the theoretical 
background about the evolution of the political-administrative relationship; the second 
provides an overview of Italian Senior Civil Service reforms by empirical accounts of 
the main changes within the core executive; the last segment draws conclusions about 
the new and emerging pattern of relationship between politics and administration in Italy 
and in contemporary democracies.   
 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE 
RELATIONSHIPS 
Given the importance and universal nature of the relationship of political leaders to 
bureaucracy, academics and practitioners have focused considerable attention on this 
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issue. One of the most durable of doctrines is the politics-administration dichotomy – the 
need to create a clear separation between political and administrative responsibilities – 
since the writings of Woodrow Wilson and Max Weber: politicians act as sovereign 
representatives of political values and interests; bureaucrats are subordinate policy 
executors, whose major concern is efficiency. However, there is mounting evidence, 
both theoretical and empirical, that this doctrine is far too simplistic and just does not 
hold up in practice. Several studies have suggested that in reality the respective role 
conceptions and interaction patterns between politicians and administrators are more 
complex and differentiated (Suleiman 1984; Dogan 1975; Putnam 1975; Aberbach, 
Putnam and Rockman 1981; Panebianco 1986; Peters 1987; Isernia 1995; Svara 2001; 
Page 2003). 
First, the most known systematic research effort on the topic dated back to the 
beginning of the 1980s. At that time Italy – along with Britain, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Sweden and US – was part of a comparative study undertaken by 
Aberbach et al. (1981) on the attitudes, values and patterns of behavior of governmental 
élites in western democracies. Aberbach et al. pointed out a growing involvement of 
civil servants in what had traditionally been described as ‘political’ role. Of their well 
known four images to describe the relationship between politicians and administrators, 
image IV (the perfect symbiosis of roles, in which ministers and senior officials play 
undifferentiated roles in policy development and management) seemed to be the 
dominant pattern of political-administrative interaction in the eighties. 
Second, Peters (1987) identifies five ideal-typical models of interaction on a continuum 
goes from the traditional Weberian separation and hierarchy to the ‘administrative 
state’, in which bureaucrats dominate the policy process thanks to their expertise, 
making the role of political leaders marginal. In between both ends of the continuum 
there are the intermediate categories of ‘village life’, ‘functional village life’ and 
‘adversarial politics’. In the village life model politicians and bureaucrats have similar 
values and goals, most important being preserving of government, smooth process of 
governance; functional model is similar to village life model, but the integration of the 
parties is developed through functional lines, the actors in a policy area, independent of 
their status, form a functional group that has little or no connections outside; in the 
conflict model administrators and politicians fight for domination in policy process.  
Third, a more promising approach, one that is attracting a growing consensus among 
academics and practitioners, calls for a partnership between political leaders and their 
staff based on complementarity. The key notion of ‘complementarity’ is founded on the 
assumption that ‘politicians and administrators are highly dependent upon each other for 
getting their respective jobs done’ (Svara 2001). For interpreting political-
administrative interactions, Svara adopts two dimensions: ‘political control’ and 
‘professional independence’. The ‘control dimension’ refers to the capacity of 
politicians to set directions and maintain oversight, while the ‘bureaucratic 
independence dimension’ focuses on the professional capacity of bureaucracy in policy 
formulation and implementation. The author suggests that a high degree of political 
control may actually co-exist with a high level of bureaucratic professional 
independence. Svara calls this ‘a state of complementarity’: it entails reciprocal 
influence and mutual deference between elected officials and administrators. 
Bureaucrats are involved in shaping policy by giving it specific content and meaning in 
the implementation process. Politicians oversee implementation, controlling over 
bureaucratic performances. In this way politicians and bureaucrats maintain distinct 
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roles based on their perspective and values, and their formal positions, but their 
behaviour necessarily overlap.  Complementarity seems to solve a typical dilemma in 
public administration life. How can politicians keep control and, at the same time, allow 
bureaucratic independence in terms of professional values and responsiveness to the 
public? The solution might be in recognizing the reciprocal values, role and influence 
that underlie complementarity. Political élites could in theory dominate administrative 
action, but they are bounded by a respect for bureaucratic competence and commitment. 
Bureaucratic élites could use their relevant resources to become self-directed as well, 
but they are constrained by commitment to accountability. 
 
THE ITALIAN SENIOR CIVIL SERVICE: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 
PATTERNS 
Background 
First, we need to outline the context of political-administrative relations in Italy. The 
Italian administrative reform is enclosed into the general transformation process the 
political system has been faced since the beginning of the 1990s.  
Broadly speaking, the Italian political system has been characterized since its 
constitution by the following factors: the dominance of the Christian Democratic Party 
(DC) and its satellites for almost fifty years; the tactical exclusion of the second largest 
political party (and culture) – the Italian Communist Party (PCI) – from national power 
until 1990s; the systematic party colonization of the state machine; the routinisation of 
what is called ‘illicit governance’, based on extensive network of exchange spanning the 
public administration, public sector, and political parties (Bull and Rhodes 1997: 5). 
This traditional model was upset by a deep crisis mainly due to conjunctural elements 
triggered by the scandal Tangentopoli2 and the consequent collapse of traditional parties 
between 1992 and 1994, giving leeway to the change of the overall political-
institutional system and regime (from First to Second Republic)3. Furthermore, the 
introduction of the plurality electoral system in 1993 (which has significantly 
downsized the number of political forces) and the resulting bipolar competition among 
parties have reduced the distance between bureaucracy and citizens (Bartolini and 
D’Alimonte 1997; Pasquino 2002; Fabbrini 2004). These processes have therefore 
required a higher degree of bureaucratic accountability and responsiveness and a closer 
relationship between who is directly elected – the politicians – and who is responsible 
for the implementation of the program people vote – the bureaucrats – challenging the 
traditional interaction pattern between the two élites.  
Italy, during the 1990s is a case of politico-administrative context in motion, and 
context and its dynamics seem to be a relevant explanatory factor of NPM reforms 
(Ongaro and Vallotti, 2008: 180). Without such a scenario, any reforms would have 
been considerably watered-down. Under the effects of the changing political-
institutional setting, the reform cycle of public administration in Italy was therefore 
more radical than in other European countries (ibidem).  
The Italian Senior Civil Service, although many attempts to reform it since its 
constitution in 1972, has been challenged late, compared to other western bureaucratic 
élites. The first significant reform dated back to 1993, with the legislation n. 29/1993 on 
the ‘privatisation’ of the status of civil servants, and it has been recently reorganized by 
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l. n. 15/2009 and by legislation L. n. 15/2009 and DL. n. 150/2009 (the Brunetta 
reform).  
The overall aim of the reform process was to redefine the role, the skills, the 
professional expertise, and the career pattern of top bureaucrats. The 1993 reform has 
especially had a strong impact on the Senior Civil Service portrait (as we shall see in the 
next paragraphs) by reviewing and enhancing top officials powers. As a result, senior 
civil servants have got both more autonomy over expenditure and responsibility for 
technical and administrative implementation of policy. Increased flexibility in public 
service employment contracts, greater mobility both within and outside the 
administration, decentralization of recruitment and training are among the main 
innovation elements introduced within the public sector. By taking as an example 
company-like HR management styles and practices, a number of major innovations 
marked a break with the past (Gualmini 2007). Firstly, the special public law regime for 
civil service employment was dismantled in favor of collective bargaining: a private 
regulation of civil servants’ employment conditions and wages, based on centralized 
collective bargaining with the trade unions, was introduced. Decentralized and 
individual bargaining were included in the reform process, in order to link productivity/ 
performance with the salary. Indeed, assessment bodies were set up for performance 
evaluation. Openness to external recruitment was actively promoted, as well as mobility 
within the public administration and between the private and public sector. Furthermore, 
competitive training courses have been introduced and opened to all those passing an 
initial competition (not only to those already employed in the public sector, but also to 
those under 35 years of age with a university degree). The selected candidates are 
expected to attend two training years at the High School of Public Administration 
(SSPA), included a six months internship at a private or public organization.  
In 1998, legislative decree no. 80 completed the reform process by extending collective 
bargaining to top level civil servants, and by introducing a type of "spoils" system for 
those senior civil servants (grade 1) who had to be confirmed or removed from office 
within the first three months of each new legislature. In addition, the spoils system was 
extended to grade 2 senior civil servants as well, in 2002. The minimum term for senior 
civil servants’ contracts was also abolished, and the percentage of external access to 
senior positions was increased.  
Finally, the current administrative reform promoted by the Minister of Public Function, 
Renato Brunetta, has been mainly pursuing the wave of the nineties reforms, by 
increasing top bureaucrats autonomy and power in human resources management and 
by introducing measures for bureaucratic management skills and professional 
competence development. The legislation n. 15/2009 especially emphasized meritocracy 
by focusing on individual and collective performance and on the accountability of 
public officials. It has been introducing a transparency principle aiming at evaluating 
administrative structures as well as civil servants by the creation of a new central 
independent agency dedicated to evaluation (Drumaux 2009). 
Profile of the Italian Senior Civil Service 
A) Social Background 
Research on the composition of élites in virtually every polity has shown a 
disproportionate representation of educated, high-status males, particularly at the top of 
the political and administrative hierarchy (Aberbach et al. 1981). Looking at our 
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 11  ·  Issue 1  ·  2010  ·  © International Public Management Network 
95 
 
samples of senior civil servants (Graph 1), although Italian bureaucracy still shows a 
male overrepresentation at the top, the percentage of  women has increased a lot after 
reforms (from 4 to 28 percent). 
 
 Graph 1 - Gender representation among top bureaucrats 
 
                Source: Author computations based on IRSTA and Institute Cattaneo data 
 
The average age of Italian senior civil servants is usually higher than in other western 
bureaucracies. However, in the twenty-one-century it has decreased (Graph 2). The 
chance to hire top civil servants by temporary contracts has allowed well educated 
young people and outsiders to enter the apex of administration. In the nineties, 45 per 
cent of top officials are between 54 and 64 years old and only 14 per cent are included 
in the youngest cluster (32 - 42 years); while in the 2000s the most (42 percent) are in 
the cluster ‘44-65’ and the youngest component has considerably increased compared to 
ten years before. 
 
 Graph 2 - Top bureaucrats by age 
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Data on senior civil servants’ educational background in the nineties are drawn from 
Cassese’s work (1999). Taking as sample the top bureaucrats working within the prime 
minister’s office, he found 53 percent holding law degrees (and this figure climbs to 
percent if we include those with degrees in political science, a discipline that in Italy has 
a large law component). These figures may be compared with that of only 3 percent for 
engineering degrees. As for their origin, Cassese points out how high civ
promoted from the lower grades of the administration comprise 83 percent of the total. 
Horizontal mobility was almost non
who, on reaching retirement, were appointed as chairmen of public or priv
companies. 
As far as the pattern of education of top officials in 2002, the law degree still prevails 
(46 percent), even if the percentage of people with different degrees has increased (16 
percent for economics, 12 percent for social sciences, 11 per
percent for agronomy, 4 percent for medicine, etc.).
 
 
                
 
Cassese identifies two ideal types of recruitment systems, differing in the permeability 
of the recruitment channels. At one extreme are what we may term ‘guild systems’, 
which require long apprenticeship within a single institution as a prerequisite for 
admission to the élite.  At the other extreme are ‘entrepreneurial systems’, characterized 
by a high degree of lateral entry into the élite from outside careers and institutions. 
Before reforms Italian bureaucracy fitted the model of guild recruitment almos
perfectly. The average senior Italian bureaucrat entered the civil service at the age of 22 
and there he has stayed for 35 years. More than 90 percent of the members of this 
gerontocracy have spent their entire adult life in national government and more 
percent have spent all this time in a single ministry. Lateral entrants into the Italian 
bureaucratic élite were virtually non existent (Cassese 1999). This ‘ossified structure’  
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has been challenged by reforms, which have tried to differentiate entry in public 
administration and to introduce some forms of exchange with the private sector, leading 
to different career paths. Firstly, looking at status of entry (Table 1), we see an increase 
in the percentage of those who entered public administration by directly covering senior 
positions, compared to the past. 
 
Table 1 - Top bureaucrats by status of entry (%) 
 1991 2002 
Senior position 6,1 9,4 
No senior position 93,9 90,6 
Tot. 100 100 
Source: Author computations based on IRSTA and Institute Cattaneo data 
 
Secondly, turning to organizational background, we find at the top a higher percentage 
of people with managerial experience coming from the private sector after reforms: in 
the 1990s, the 16 percent of the sample had a previous experience in a private 
organization (Table 2), while in the 2000s the percentage rises to a total of 
approximately 27 (Table 3). 
 
 Table 2 - Organizational background (1991) 
 % 
Private organizations 15,6 
Public organizations 84,4 
Tot. 100 
 Source: Author computations based on IRSTA data 
 
 Table 3 - Experience in the private sector (2002) 
 % 
No experience in private sector 73,2 
Experience in private sector 24 
Experience in private sector as a senior 2,8 
Tot. 100 
 Source: Author computations based on IRSTA and Institute Cattaneo data 
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To sum up, the picture of the Italian Senior Civil Service emerging by our description is 
that of continuity and change at the same time. Before reform it was an ‘ossified 
structure’ (Cassese 1999), where access was restricted through internal promotions and 
progress on the hierarchical ladder was mainly conditioned by age and length of service. 
The senior civil service was therefore aged, with a marked underrepresentation of 
women and a high percentage of law graduates. After reforms, the average age of top 
civil servants has decreased, the percentage of women is higher than in the past, the 
educational background shows an increasing proportion of managers holding not only 
an university degree in law or political science, but a degree in other disciplines as well. 
Although the overall portrait of Italian Senior Civil Service keeps the general traits, new 
bureaucratic features emerge as indicators of the adaptation process of bureaucracy to 
the changing environment. 
 
The next step of our study is to explore the changes within Italian core executive by 
analysing what both politicians and bureaucrats think and perceive about political-
administrative relationship. The political-institutional setting as well as the rule of law 
are certainly important in order to establish any change. However, they are not by 
themselves sufficient to develop a new model of managerial leadership. The logic of 
action, values, cultural processes of those who are at the top of the political-
administrative system – senior civil servants and political leaders – are definitely to be 
taken into account.  
Interactions at the top 
Bureaucrats, as is frequently claimed, live in a world of more structured relationships. 
According to the Image I designed by Aberbach et al., the world of bureaucrats is 
largely one of insular hierarchical relationships (Aberbach et al. 1981). The bureaucrats’ 
principal reference points are upward and downward in their organization, and 
occasionally lateral to other sectors of the government bureaucracy. In this view they 
rarely need to deal directly with politicians, interest groups, or citizens. Conversely, 
politicians are thought to mediate the links connecting government, parties and society. 
If the world of bureaucrat is largely confined to the formal administrative apparatus of 
the government and if his network of contacts runs mostly upward and downward, the 
politician reaches outward to his society. His world in contrast to the reputed precision 
of the bureaucrats is governed by multiple demands from party leaders, interest groups, 
local interests and citizens who cast ballots.         
In order to rebuild the framework of contacts between politicians and bureaucrats we 
analysed two dimensions: 
1. the frequency of contacts; 
2. how these contacts are structured. 
Mapping out the basic contact patterns is important to understand to whom each is 
especially attentive. Rates of contact between actors in a political system provide 
important information although they do not tell us about the substance of these contacts. 
While the sheer quantity of interaction is not necessarily equivalent to its importance, 
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 Table 4 -   Pattern of contactsa between bureaucrats and politicians (%) 
 Pre - Reform Post - Reform 
Never 72 19,1 
4 - 8 times year - - 
8 - 12 times year  19,1 
More than once a month 17,2 48,9 
More than once a week 10,8 12,8 
Tot. 100 100 
 a. How many times do you deal the administration questions with your political master? 
Source: Author computations based on IRSTA and Institute Cattaneo data 
 
It is surprising to note that the contacts between politicians and bureaucrats have 
drastically increased in recent years, showing a less self-centered and isolated 
bureaucracy than in the past (Table 4). By going depth into the analysis and exploring 
how the bureaucracy contacts are structured, we find out that the political figure still 
represents the main stakeholder for bureaucrats:  
 
            Table 5 - Bureaucracy stakeholders 
  Main actorsa  Level of influenceb (%)  
 Pre-Reform  Post-Reform  
Politicians 87.5 78.8 
Government 54.2 65.9 
Bureaucrats 41.6 40.5 
Parliament 29.6 35.7 
Interest groups 11.1 33.6 
  a. Which actors most influence the department’s administration in which you work? 
  b. Percentages refer  to the high level of influence on the scale which goes from ‘high’ to ‘none’                 
  influence 
    Source: Author computations based on IRSTA and Institute Cattaneo data 
 
Apart from politicians, who obviously are the most influential actors, it is interesting to 
see how the network in which bureaucracy is embedded is made up. Political state 
actors are dominant, yet bureaucrats are among the first places. This stresses the 
bureaucracy relevant role in the government administration. Political parties and interest 
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groups follow in the last position, nonetheless covering from 10 to 36 per cent of 
relevance. Once again the emerged configuration challenges the conventional idea of 
bureaucracy as a body standing apart from actors which are not included in its 
structured world. 
Some scholars have observed that there is a great cleavage between the political class 
and the administrative class in Italy especially referring to attitudes and social 
background (Putnam 1973; Aberbach et al. 1981). However data in this study suggest 
that Italian bureaucrats have a fair amount of contacts with politicians. The explanation 
for this might be in that the Italian administrative system combines authoritarian traits 
with clientelistic penetration and political favoritism, so that the higher civil service is, 
at one and at the same time, politicized and antipolitical. Cassese as well describes the 
outlook of Italian bureaucrats as ‘schizophrenic, the attitude of those who despise 
politics, but make use of it’. The Italian state, ruled by the Christian Democratic party 
for more than three decades, was riven by factionalism. The right party credentials 
provided the calling card for parliamentary entrée into the bureaucratic labyrinth. This 
linkage process ‘can involve a bargaining relationship where favors are exchanged 
between MPs, offering their support for certain measures in Parliament, and 
bureaucrats, providing particular services for the parliamentarian or his constituents’ 
(Cassese 1999). Factionalized politics and fragmented authority precluded government 
responsiveness on major issue, but on particularized issues bureaucracy was often 
responsive to requests of deputies from the ruling party. Senior civil servants were 
unsympathetic to the tugs and pulls of democratic politics, but in a cruder sense they 
were thoroughly politicized. 
Role perception 
By analysing the ways in which bureaucrats and politicians focus on their role, we see 
that each is drawn to the policy making function, although in distinctive ways and 
filtered through distinctive constituencies. Because bureaucrats possess special 
resources of expertise and detailed knowledge, politicians may fear threats to their own 
authority in the policy process posed by bureaucrats’ tactical advantages. We might 
expect politicians therefore to define a more passive and compliant role for bureaucrats 
than bureaucrats accept for themselves. On the other side of the coin, bureaucrats may 
view politicians as interfering irrationally with knowledgeable decisions, and they may 
define the roles of politicians in ways that limit their involvement in day to day policy 
making.  
To determine how bureaucrats and politicians define one another’s role as well as their 
own, we use the question through which each one describes the qualities he thinks an 
administrator should have and those he thinks any politicians should possess. 
Interviewees largely declare that the weberian ideal-type of separation between the 
sphere of politics and of administration should be the principle which shapes the 
distinction of roles and tasks between politicians and bureaucrats. However, both 
ministers and top officials are aware that this is not always the case, because bureaucrats 
tend to assume a political role, and politicians interfere in administration field. While 
bureaucrats mention primarily interference in administrative issues as the main point of 
weakness of politicians, politicians similarly accuse bureaucrats to escape their field of 
competence playing a decision role that is not up to them. At the same time both groups 
of actors recognize their respectively points of strength: top officials identify as 
elements of force the ability of politicians to define policy guidelines and the legitimacy 
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that comes from their electoral mandate, as well as the capacity to transform political 
preferences into public policies. Politicians themselves admit the supremacy of 
bureaucrats as far as the knowledge of the administrative machinery and the technical 
competence.  
Traditional conceptions of the bureaucratic role emphasize efficiency, neutral execution 
of laws, technical expertise and intellectual ability. There is strong agreement between 
bureaucrats and politicians on the traits that are desirable for bureaucratic role (Table 6). 
Both actors agree that the best resources linked to civil service are in order ‘technical 
skills’ and ‘information’. What is surprising is the low rate both elites give to ‘neutral 
execution’, one of the fundamental traits of bureaucracy according to the Weberian 
ideal-type. Politicians especially have the idea that bureaucrats should principally 
provide intellectual and technical skills to the process, recognizing as relevant 
knowledge, corporativism, sociability and length of stay in office as well. Bureaucrats 
are more confident in technical skills and information, and expertise, less in sociability, 
esprit de corp and neutral execution, no mentioning the staying in office.   
 
 Table 6 -  Mention and rank orders of traits accorded to the role of 
 a senior civil servant (2000s) 










Information 36.8 2 27.3 2 
Corporativism 2.6 5 9.1 4 
Neutral execution 2 6 - - 
Technical skills 48 1 36.4 1 
Knowledge and Expertise 7.9 3 11.2 3 
Sociability 2.7 4 7 6 
Length of stay in office - - 9 5 
Tot. 100  100  
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ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM EFFECTS ON THE POLITICAL-
ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITHIN THE ITALIAN CORE 
EXECUTIVE  
In order to assess the impact of administrative reforms on the political-administrative 
relationship - that is whether is a gap between the elites’ behavior as it previously 
emerged and their perceptions - we refer to the following  question by the dataset: how 
do you briefly describe the political-administrative relationship in the decision making 
process on the basis of your experience? The answers have been coded into four 
relationship patterns according to models depicted by the main literature: 
1. bureaucracy implements what political authority decides. This statement 
identifies the weberian model, that is the separation of powers; 
2. the political decision legitimates what the bureaucracy decides. This is the case 
of the so called ‘administrative state’ (Peters, 1987), where the bureaucracy have 
a predominant role in the state government; 
3. bureaucrats and politicians decide together in a reciprocal exchange process. I 
use this question to refer to the ‘complementarity model’ (Svara, 2001); 
4. bureaucracy legitimates what the political elites decide. In this case politicians 
have still a dominant position, but bureaucracy just legitimizes political 
decisions, being not able to implement it. This pattern is called “laissez-faire” 
(Svara, 2001): the “live and let live” attitude characterizes the political-
administrative systems, in which bureaucracy is not able to autonomously 
organize itself and the highly fragmented and unstable executive can not rely on 
a government majority, which makes it possible an effective political control of 
the bureaucracy. 
 
Tab 7 - Models of the politicians-bureaucrats relationship 
 Pre-reform Post-reform 
Weberian 34,8 18,5 
Administrative State 2,2 26,3 
Laissez-faire 42,7 24,2 
Complementarity 20,2 31 
Total 100,0 100 
 Source: Author computations based on IRSTA and Institute Cattaneo data 
 
The data from the 1990s and 2000s both confirm that the Weberian model depicted by 
Aberbach et al. for the Italian case is increasingly disappearing. Although most of 
interviewees describe the political-administrative relation in terms of ‘dichotomy’, when 
they are asked for day-to-day interaction, they develop a pattern of relationships based 
more on integration than separation. In the words of respondents, bureaucrats are 
‘technical experts, who control politicians’ work, based on their skills and competence 
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in the field’ and politicians are ‘decision makers who need top administrators’ 
professional advices in order to define policy issues and problems’.   
Even when they are asked about their opinions regarding the spoils system, they mostly 
answered that it could increase the level of the politico-administrative system’s 
performance, as it supports formation of trust-based relationship between political 
leaders and top administrators (“The spoils system makes the bureaucratic machine 
responsive to the changing political environment”). This aspect of reform is 
controversial when viewed in the larger context of modern public administration in that, 
as noted, the purpose for establishing formal, rule driven and honest civil service 
systems worldwide has been to eliminate spoils systems. Despite this, evidence from 
this research reveals that in Italy the spoils system is not regarded as producing 
undesirable consequences by respondents to this research. The tradeoff of greater 
opportunity to empower more trustworthy civil servants appears to outweigh the 
patronage related risks in this case. The issue of trust is thus a vital aspect of this 
reform. Politicians appear willing to trust those they select. This seems logical but what 
is not apparent is whether any obligations are accepted by bureaucrats under this 
arrangement, and what favors, if any, politicians expect from the bureaucrats they 
promote. 
Although political appointment might undermine bureaucratic impartiality, it does not 
necessarily lead to partisanship or clientelism (Mattei 2007; Peters and Pierre 2004; 
Svara 2001). By looking at the Italian case, political appointment has served as a 
structural incentive to overcome the low degree of integration between political and 
administrative élites. The key reform objective of political control was to break the old 
pattern of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. It was one of mutual reserve 
and of ‘live and let live’ attitude (self-restraint) resulting in an implicit exchange 
between political power and job security (Cassese 1984). In that case, bureaucratic 
autonomy was based more on law enforcement than on government capacity. The party 
colonization model was associated with the clientelistic practices and party patronage 
endemic in the First Republic (1948–92): Italy state administration at all levels became 
a domesticated, inefficient and underpaid bureaucracy, whose members tried to protect 
themselves against the external pressure of a single party government (Mattei 2007). 
Conversely, the public administration reform process has challenged the political-
administrative interaction within the core executive, by moving it from self-restraint 
towards complementarity pattern.  
 
It is clearly evident by our study4 that the traditional bureaucratic model of leadership 
has undergone significant changes: professional competence, work experience outside 
of public administration, goal achievement, level of performance all have become 
essential elements for career development. The new manager profiles introduced by 
administrative reforms have actually increased management skills within Italian senior 
civil service. While in the pre-reform regime, systems of selection and career based on 
exogenous factors (titles, examinations, good relations, etc.) have prevailed, in the post-
reform they are more oriented to take into consideration endogenous factors 
(professionalism, performance, accountability, etc.). Furthermore, the traditional 
patronage model has been gradually replaced by a system of spoils aimed to promote 
greater mobility not only internal but also external to the public organisation, in order to 
increase the level of competence and experience of the bureaucratic élite.  
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As a result, the observed behavior of politicians and top bureaucrats seems to converge 
to what Svara calls ‘a state of complementarity’: it is grounded in a pattern of 
overlapping roles in the political-administrative relationship, but at the same time it 
draws on models of separate roles, administrative autonomy and political 
responsiveness as well (Svara 1999). Both elites  maintain distinct perspectives based 
on their unique values and the differences in their formal positions; bureaucrats have 
partially overlapping functions as elected officials provide political oversight of 
administration and administrators are involved in policy making; there is 
interdependency and reciprocal influence between elected officials and administrators. 
 
To conclude, the administrative reform process has influenced Italian political-
administrative relationship in the direction of both a higher degree of integration 
between the two élites and an increasing role of top executives in the decision-policy 
making process. Although the weberian ideal-type of separation keeps to be the 
prescriptive model for political-administrative relationship, in practice ministers and top 
department officials overwhelmingly emphasize the cooperative character of their 
interaction. Both politicians and bureaucrats questioned on their life at the top seem to 
outline a relationship mainly oriented towards complementarity of roles and functions.  
 
THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICIANS AND 
BUREAUCRATS IN CONTEMPORARY  DEMOCRACIES: CONVERGENCE 
TO COMPLEMENTARITY? 
Although the article’s purpose was mainly a descriptive one, we can now draw some 
insights for political-administrative relationship pattern in contemporary democracies. 
Analysis of the Italian case confirms that changes in political – administrative relations 
remain mainly path dependent (Page and Wright 1999–2007; Rhodes and Weller 2001; 
Peters and Pierre 2001–2004). The NPM reform concepts (i.e. the model of separation 
between politicians and bureaucrats) are evidently filtered, interpreted and modified 
through the combination of nationally based processes. In some cases they have had 
paradoxical effects such as in Italy, where the increasing autonomy given to top 
administrators has resulted in a more politicized senior civil service. As our analysis has 
shown, the separation of politics from administration has led to the search of new forms 
of political control and mechanisms of integration between political and bureaucratic 
élites. This apparent contradiction could be explained taking into account the effects of 
the changing political and institutional setting,5 which has demanded more 
accountability and responsiveness by both politicians and bureaucrats.6  
However, by placing the Italian case in a comparative perspective, we find that it is not 
unique and a general trend is emerging across contemporary democracies. In many 
countries, NPM, administrative reforms, political-institutional changes have challenged 
roles and workings of ministers and top officials, and consequently, the nature of their 
relationships (Peters and Pierre 2001–2004; Page and Wright 1999–2007; Rhodes and 
Weller 2001; ´T Hart e Wille 2006; Brans et al. 2006). Several studies show similar 
shifts in the rules of the political - administrative game at the top. For instance, Rhodes 
and Weller  (2001) illustrate how similar changes in the political policy advice and 
managerial roles of departmental secretaries have taken place in various countries: 
senior civil servants must be useful to the political officeholder in managing an 
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increasingly complex environment. ‘The norms governing the relationships of ministers 
and top officials reflect the growing awareness of interdependency: both sides stress 
professionalism, teamwork, collaboration and complementarity’, ´T Hart and Wille 
conclude so far their case study on the Dutch core executive (2006: 144). Page and 
Wright (1999) identify in their comparative study on bureaucratic élites a common 
theme in the development of relationships between politicians and bureaucrats, that is a 
personalization of political trust. There is a common trend among western democracies 
to appoint people in whom politicians have trust, and to develop closer personal ties 
with political masters by top officials. In this terms, changes in bureaucracy are linked 
to change in the political settings.   
Richards and Smith (2004) point out that NPM reforms marked a radical shift from the 
formal Weberian separation and hierarchy model to a more appropriate reflection of the 
relationship between ministers and civil servants based on co-dependency which 
involves an exchange of resources: departments need strong ministers, capable of 
defending their interests in the political arena and beyond; ministers, conversely, want 
officials who bring expertise, in terms of both policymaking and the bureaucratic 
process, and responsiveness to their policy.  
Furthermore, Aberbach and Rockman (2006) by analysing the changing relationship 
between politicians and bureaucrats founded on their long-term in-depth study of the 
attitudes, values and beliefs of high level executives and elected officials, conclude that 
‘Civil servants, in this regime, are meant to be experts who can ‘speak truth to power’ 
based on their experience, professional qualifications, and long experience. They are 
there to help politicians implement new or revised policies, but also to advise them on 
what has worked or failed in the past and on ways to modify proposals to make them 
more feasible’ (2006: 993).  
Finally, the current financial crisis has strengthened the shifting of political-
administrative relationship to a complementarity pattern in Italy and in other western 
European countries as well. Top level bureaucrats have been required to become more 
autonomous leaders in managing human resources with the goals of a lower cost and 
easier accessed public service, and a more transparent and more efficient, better 
organized administration as OECD has stressed as essential.  
As a result, the relationship between politics and administration has been challenged 
and increasingly transformed to a more pragmatic-professional interaction between 
actors with potentially complementary contributions to successful policy-making. The 
new global setting and the effects of administrative reform have provided the 
opportunity to instil a more productive collaborative relationship at the heart of national 
governments in contemporary democracies. 
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I The two mentioned research projects represent the most widespread research on the 
Italian Civil Service carried out in the last few years. Before these only a few 
"qualitative studies" appeared. 
II Tangentopoli (from the word ‘tangent’ meaning a contribution or bribe paid by 
private and public companies to political parties in exchange for public contracts 
and favorable treatment) was the name used to describe the corruption-based system 
in politics that had its heyday in Italy through the 1980s and early 1990s until the 
Mani pulite investigation ended much of it in 1992. 
III For a brief but useful description of the Italian crisis, see Mershon and Pasquino, 
1995, and Bufacchi and Burgess, 1998.  
IV Recent qualitative studies (see Carboni and Barbetta, 2009) based on interviews of a 
sample of Italian top bureaucrats at the central and regional level confirm the trends 
emerging from this study. As result of the administrative reforms a new generation 
of public managers view themselves as like their private sector counterparts, i.e., 
more oriented to a modern, efficient and accountable administration at the service of 
the citizens, and more capable of adapting to the rapidly changing world compared 
to the past.  
V  Pollitt and Bouckaert argue that reform trajectories are broadly determined by the 
features of the regime type: the regime type determines the reform capacity of a 
country (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004) 
VI For example, Peters (1996: 226) points out that, “...the ideas which have guided     
reform are nearly the same around the world...what is different is how political 
systems have interpreted the ideas and responded to the demands and/or 
opportunities for inductive administrative change.” 
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